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PLUS CA CHANGE 
Paul Brest* 
Harry Edwards and I both finished law school in 1965, and his 
article presents an occasion to consider how much the legal academy 
has changed during the intervening years. Animating Judge Edwards' 
complaints about the contemporary legal academy is a nostalgia for 
happier days. His images are of decline - of a growing disjunction 
between the academy and practice, of law schools' abandoning their 
proper missions, of their movement toward pure theory. 1 My own 
view is quite different. Except for some noteworthy demographic 
transformations and a healthy broadening of the academic agenda, 
legal education has changed little during these almost thirty years. I 
find this regrettable, for reasons I will sketch at the end of this 
comment. 
Especially because my impressions diverge from those of Judge 
Edwards, let me state two premises that I imagine we share. First, 
legal education is, at its core, professional education. Our primary 
aim is to prepare students to become skillful and responsible practicing 
lawyers, policymakers, and judges. (We prepare future law professors 
as well, but this is a subsidiary mission.) Second, legal scholarship 
ought to serve both the practical purpose of aiding these various pro-
fessionals in their work and the intellectual purpose of expanding legal 
knowledge and thought for their own sake. The two aims are related 
for, like basic research in other fields, knowledge pursued for its own 
sake sometimes turns out to have practical implications. With this 
introduction, let me offer my own thoughts about the legal academy 
then and now. 
INTELLECTUAL AGENDAS 
When Judge Edwards and I were law students, the academy was 
dominated by a single school of legal thought: "legal process" - an 
amalgam of policy-oriented doctrinalism and concern for the differing 
competencies of legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts in 
legal decisionmaking. At Harvard and many other schools, legal pro-
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cess was the only game in town. To use a term that one would not 
have encountered in law reviews in those days, but that has been made 
almost commonplace by critical legal studies (CLS), it was 
"hegemonic." 
Legal process has been remarkably tenacious, and it remains the 
tacit core of most law teaching and scholarship today. Especially in 
the scholarly sphere, however, it now competes with a number of 
other genres. Of these, law and economics is the most influential, hav-
ing infiltrated the very vocabulary of private law and even some parts 
of public law. Critical legal studies, a descendent of the legal realist 
movement, challenged legal process' claims to be nonideological and 
opposed itself to the ideology of law and economics. I speak in the 
past tense because CLS - whose size, influence, and threat to the 
dominant order were in any event exaggerated by the spectacle of 
Harvard's civil war - has largely been eclipsed by the critical race 
and feminist scholarship to which it gave rise. These newer genres 
purport to view the legal system from the perspective of those on "the 
bottom"2 and sometimes rely on real or fictitious narratives as much 
as on more conventional forms of legal analysis. The contemporary 
law and literature movement has been influenced both by CLS and the 
postmodernist approaches commonplace in the humanities. Law and 
society, and especially the empirical study of legal institutions, also 
has roots in legal realism; it has not flourished to nearly the same de-
gree as scholarship that can be done without ever leaving one's office. 
While some of the writing in these contemporary genres is quite ab-
stractly theoretical, quite a lot is avowedly policy- and practice-ori-
ented, proposing and arguing for doctrinal and institutional law 
reform.3 
THE PROFESSORIATE 
With several exceptions, the faculty that has brought about this 
change looks and acts very much like its predecessors. Then, as now, 
2. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987). 
3. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 Mo. L. REV. 
255 (1990) (CLS); Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income 
Housing: ''Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 485 (1987) (CLS); Charles R. 
Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
431 (critical race theory); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Low, 100 
YALE L.J. 1281 (1991) (feminist legal theory); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, 
Antidiscrimination Low, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 
(1991) (critical race theory); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lowyering, 101 HARV. L. 
REv. 1083 (1988) (CLS); Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 
611 (1988) (CLS); Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 641 (1990) (CLS and feminist legal theory). 
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the typical law professor has served for a year or two as a law·cierk to 
a judge and spent several years in practice, typically with a corporate 
firm. Every era has its great teachers - those who deeply challenge 
and inspire their students - as well as its share of less-than-greats. 
Today's legal academy does not seem to attract more or fewer inspir-
ing teachers than it did in the past. 
The two most significant changes in the professoriate are the pres-
ence of women and people of color, who were almost entirely absent 
among the professors with whom Judge Edwards and I studied. While 
women and minority law professors are responsible for the new genres 
of feminist legal theory and critical race theory, most do not write or 
teach in these genres. Rather, ~hey do the same sort of doctrinal-
policy work as their white male counterparts. Another change during 
these three decades is that more of today's professors - like the stu-
dents from whom they are drawn - have done advanced work, or 
even hold graduate degrees, in other disciplines- economics, history, 
philosophy, and medicine .. I am not at all certain, however, that these 
professors' teaching and scholarship tends to be more theoretically ori-
ented than that of their colleagues who hold only J.D.s. 
THE STUDENT BODY 
Today's student body is more diverse than Judge Edwards' and my 
classmates. Nationwide, forty-three percent are women, seventeen 
percent are members of minority groups, 4 and quite a few have had 
several years' work experience since college. . 
Today's students are less sanguine about the likelihood of a fulfil-
ling professional life and a satisfying mix of a professional and per-
sonal life than was our generation - perhaps an adjustment to 
contemporary realities. Nonetheless, they do not seem more, or less, 
career oriented than did our classmates. Now, as then, most graduates 
of the elite law schools take jobs in the private sector, in large firms in 
large cities. As before, relatively few expect to work in government or 
public interest jobs. Indeed, the rising cost of tuition, larger loan bur-
dens, and the widening gulf between private and public sector salaries 
make it hard for students to resist the large firms. 
CURRICULUM AND PEDAGOGY 
The core curriculum, now as then, is doctrinal. When Judge Ed-
wards and I were in law school, the standard first-year courses were a 
4. Ken Myers, Statistics Show Minorities Have Bigger Share of Lower Enrollment, NATL. 
L.J., Mar. 22, 1993, at 4. 
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year long. Many law schools have since compressed the required cur-
riculum - without compromising the first year's primary mission of 
teaching legal analysis and without noticeably diminishing students' 
legal cultural literacy.5 Today's students take the same advanced doc-
trinal courses that we did - Corporations, Evidence, Trusts and Es-
tates, Commercial Law, and Tax - along with some newer ones, such 
as Criminal Procedure and Environmental Law. Students now have a 
broader choice of electives - many sophisticated advanced profes-
sional courses as well as some that look like graduate school courses. 
On the whole, however, a law student's transcript today would not 
look much less profession oriented than ours. Indeed, a student from 
the 1960s would feel quite at home in most classrooms of the 1990s. 
Though he would be struck by the occasional reference to concepts 
from law and economics and - less frequently - by ideas from criti-
cal legal studies, feminist theory, and critical race theory, he would 
seldom take a course taught mainly from any but the standard doc-
trine-policy perspective. 6 
While the dominant form of teaching remains the analysis of cases 
in a conventional classroom setting, there has been a shift in the style 
of teaching. The terrorist version of the Socratic method has almost 
disappeared, and it has been replaced by a mixture of lecture, asking 
questions of volunteers, and responding to questions from the class at 
large. In my view, we have moved too far away from the Socratic 
method, which can be intellectually challenging without being cruel -
we have thrown the etching out with the acid - but I may be in the 
minority on this. The most significant change in pedagogy over these 
thirty years is the advent of clinical methods, both through simulation 
and supervised work with actual clients. Clinical methods introduce 
students to practical lawyering skills - such as counseling, witness 
examination, and negotiation - that Judge Edwards and I did not 
acquire in law school thirty years ago; they also can enrich the teach-
ing of doctrine, policy, and legal ethics by situating them in real world 
contexts.7 
5. Cf. E.D. HIRSCH, CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW 
(1987). Of course, as in any discipline, the canon has changed over time. The constitutional law 
course I took focused on state regulation of interstate commerce and devoted little time to civil 
rights and civil liberties; the emphasis has flipped in many of today's constitutional law courses. 
6. A few of Judge Edwards' law clerks apparently had more required courses taught from 
critical perspectives - certainly more than they would have wished. This is atypical and, in-
deed, would be difficult to achieve even by design at the vast majority of law schools, elite or 
otherwise. 
7. Though clinical methods have great value, I am skeptical about law schools' placing too 
much emphasis on practical lawyering skills, which by and large are better learned when a law-
yer is in practice. 
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SCHOLARSHIP 
The most visible change in the intellectual landscape of the legal 
academy is in the law reviews - both the generic ones and the 
proliferation of journals dedicated to specialized fields such as law and 
economics, law and society, feminist legal theory, environmental law, 
and law and technology. A reader in olden days would not so often 
have encountered articles with titles such as Pragmatist and Poststruc-
turalist Critical Legal Practice 8 or Deconstructing Los Angeles or a Se-
cret Fax from Magritte Regarding Postliterate Legal Reasoning: A 
Critique of Legal Education. 9 
Because the legal academy is not defined by subdisciplines, and 
because there are so many law reviews - mostly edited by students 
rather than refereed by professionals - a perseverant professor who 
can afford the photocopying and postage can eventually get any article 
published somewhere. There is little question that the level of preten-
sion has increased, but I doubt that the overall proportion of fatuous 
articles has. While there are some law professors masquerading as 
philosophers, economists, or anthropologists, who would be laughed 
out of the university's cognate departments, many are producing first-
rate "law-and" scholarship. As in the case of more conventional 
scholarship, you usually cannot tell just from the title. 
Has there been a diminution of useful scholarship over the years? 
Not surprisingly, given his occupation, Judge Edwards focuses on doc-
trinal-policy scholarship - the grist for the machinery of appellate 
courts. The proportion of this sort of work, though perhaps not its 
absolute quantity, has declined under competition from other genres. 
Nonetheless, plenty of excellent doctrinal-policy articles continue to 
be written, treatises continue to be published, and restatements of the 
law continue to be promulgated. The law reviews undoubtedly con-
tain more abstract legal theory than they did thirty years ago; but they 
also contain articles that illuminate legal issues from various points of 
view - race, gender, economic analysis, and empirical social science 
- and that are designed to affect the ways that lawyers, judges, and 
other participants in the legal system approach fundamental legal is-
sues. While some of this work is tendentious, it is hardly more so than 
much doctrinal scholarship. 
8. Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststrocturalist Critical Legal 
Practice, 139 U. PA. L. R.E.v. 1019 (1991). 
9. C. Garrison Lepow, Deconstrocting Los Angeles or a Secret Fax from Magritte Regarding 
Post/iterate Legal Reasoning: A Critique of Legal Education, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69 (1992). 
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PROFESSIONALISM 
The underlying tone of law schools, now, as thirty years ago, is 
quasi-professional. I use the modifier, because legal education has al-
ways focused on the relatively academic side of law practice - the 
analysis of doctrine and policy - rather than on practical lawyering 
skills. 
Has there nonetheless been a decline in reverence for the law and 
for its guardians in the profession and on the bench? Most likely, yes: 
there is less grand talk about the law, and perhaps less belief in the 
possibility of law that rises above interest-group politics. This is 
hardly surprising given the widespread perception by lawyers, judges, 
and the public at large that the profession has devolved into a business 
- and one with sharp practices at that. Reverence for the law may 
also have suffered from the sorry state of the administration of justice, 
and also from the disappointed expectations that the judiciary would 
work major social transformations in racial justice and other social 
issues. 10 I doubt that the new scholarly genres contribute to cynicism 
about the law so much as manifest a wider societal discontent with the 
legal system and profession. Indeed, their writings tend to be idealistic 
and reform-minded at the same time as they criticize existing prac-
tices. What I hear mostly from law professors is not disdain, but some 
sadness in preparing students _for a professional life that many will find 
unsatisfying even while its demands frustrate the enjoyment of a fulfil-
ling personal and family life. 
In sum, the legal academy has not changed all that much in the 
thirty years since Judge Edwards and I graduated. (Nor had it 
changed much in the thirty years preceding our admission to law 
school.) Taking everything into account, a law student who fell asleep 
in 1963 and awoke in 1993 would not be astonished by his new sur-
rounds. If he had fallen asleep holding a law review - the soporific 
power was no weaker in those days - the nature and language of 
some of the articles would bewilder him, but he would find much that 
was familiar. 
WHENCE 
None of this is cause for self-congratulation. While the legal acad-
emy muddles along pretty much as it did thirty years ago, one might 
hope for more than muddling in a time when the work of lawyers is 
becoming increasingly complex; when lawyers are perceived, not with-
10. For a deeply skeptical view of the judiciary's transformative powers, see GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
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out some justification, as problem-makers rather than problem-solvers; 
when the administration, of justice often seems an oxymoron; when the 
bench and bar are wanting in courtesy and civility; and when there is 
widespread skepticism about the very possibility of a legal 
"profession." 
This is not the place to set out a detailed agenda for the reform of 
the legal academy, but let m~ conclude by mentioning several areas in 
which we could do better. First, while the case method is an excellent 
vehicle for teaching the basic skills of legal analysis in the first year, 
there is little justification for the continu~g obsession with appellate 
decisions in the second and third years. The conventional mode of 
pedagogy is poorly suited to teaching students most of the problem-
solving skills and bodies of knowledge necessary to become competent 
and sophisticated lawyers and policymakers. We have not been 
thoughtful about what these skills and bodies of knowledge are and 
therefore have not systematically considered how to go about tei,iching 
them. 11 Second, the writing abilities of our entering students have, at 
very least, not increased over the years. Yet we do little to improve 
their writing skills during law school; as a result, significant numbers 
of bright young lawyers are not able to express themselves well, 
whether in memoranda to clients or formal legal documents. Third -
pace Judge Edwards - law reviews contain a surfeit of doctrinal writ-
ing as well as high theory, to the exclusion of scholarship that con-
nects doctrine and theory with the way law actually operates. The 
legal academy seems especially uninterested in empirically based re-
search designed to improve. the systems for administering civil and 
criminal justice. 
My final point is a good news, bad news story. Judge Edwards and 
I were not required to take courses in legal ethics or professional re-
sponsibility. Like most of my classmates, I did not. If only because of 
a mandate from the ABA - inspired by Watergate - law schoqls 
now purport to teach legal ethics to all students. "Purport" gets it 
about right, for most faculties have, at best, approached the task half-
heartedly. The reasons vary from the assumption that the subject has 
no intellectual content, to the belief that courses in ethics will not 
11. Actually, the so-called Macerate Task Force has made a partial effort in this direction. 
See THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION, AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION, 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 
(1992). (Robert Macerate of Sullivan & Cromwell chaired the Task Force.) The centerpiece of 
the document, The Statement of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and Professional Values, in id. at 
135, is an exhaustive taxonomy oflawyering skills. Unfortunately, it is likely to be tarred with its 
surrounding recommendations about the time, place, and manner of teaching these skills, which, 
for good reason, are generating opposition from the legal academy. 
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change anyone's behavior, to simple laziness and inertia. 12 In fact, 
during the past several decades, legal ethics has been transformed 
from an academic backwater to the subject of much excellent scholar-
ship, showing it to be a field every bit as intellectually challenging as 
most others in the curriculum. Though the study of ethics will not 
turn bad people into good ones, it can prepare well-intentioned law-
yers to think reflectively about critical issues involving their responsi-
bilities to clients, other parties, and the public at large. At a time 
when collegial relations within the bar and public confidence in the 
profession are disturbingly low, it is not asking too much of law 
schools to take this task more seriously. 
12. On the other hand, many professors respond to the "pervasive method" - teaching ethi· 
cal issues in standard courses in the substantive and procedural contexts in which they arise - as 
if someone were trying to build a toxic waste incinerator in their backyard. 
